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Casenotes
Delaney v. Superior Court: Balancing the
Interests of Criminal Defendants and
Newspersons Under California's Shield

Law

Courts have long recognized the constitutional right of the
criminally accused to have a fair opportunity to defend against the
government's accusations.1 The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." 2 In addition, criminal defendants
have also been found to have a right to information assisting their
defense under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment However, the right to present a defense is not
absolute. Defendants must comply with evidentiary and procedural
rules established by the state which may deny defendants access to

1. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (holding that imprisoning the petitioner for
contempt without providing him an opportunity to present his defense or retain counsel violated the
due process rights of the petitioner).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2.
3.
See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (holding that defendant was entitled
to review files protected by psychotherapist-patient privilege in order to preserve defendant's rights
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). The California Constitution also provides
a criminal defendant with the right to due process and to confront witnesses. CAL. CONST., art. I, §
15. Section 15 states:
-The defendant in a criminal case has the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses
against the defendant... [and] may not. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
Id.
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necessary information or may render inadmissible relevant evidence
that would otherwise aid in their defense.4
Recently, the California Supreme Court, in Delaney v. Superior
Court,5 addressed the conflict between a defendant's right to
present a defense and a reporter's right under California's
newsperson's shield law' to avoid being adjudged in contempt for
withholding information discovered during the newsgathering
process.7 The court established that the supremacy clauses of both
the federal and state constitutions dictate that a federal
constitutional right preempts a right delineated in a state
constitution.8 The California Supreme Court concluded that an
accused who can show a violation of the federal constitutional right
to present a defense necessarily overcomes a reporter's statecreated immunity from disclosure. 9 The Delaney Court further
explained that in order to assert a constitutional right to the
reporter's testimony, defendants must show that there is a
reasonable possibility that the information sought will assist in their
defense."0 Having established that possibility, the court must then
evaluate the sensitivity or confidentiality of the information being
withheld, determine the importance of the evidence to the accused's
case, determine whether compelled disclosure will impede the
policy of the shield law, and, in certain cases, search for an
alternative source for the information that is less intrusive on the

4.
See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973) (holding that petitioner, who
was not permitted to cross-examine a key witness who confessed to the same crime for which he was
tried, or to introduce testimony from persons who heard the confession, was denied a fair trial in
violation of the due process clause). In regard to the application of the defendant's right to a fair trial
in light of a reporter's privilege, see Note, Reporters and theirSources: The ConstitutionalRight to
a ConfidentialRelation, 80 YALE LU. 317, 347 n.131 (1970) (stating that the criminally accused has
not been accorded an absolute privilege in light of other privileges, and there should be no such
absolute right with the reporter's privilege).
5. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990), reh'g denied.
6. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070(a) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that newspersons are immune
from contempt for refusing to disclose information obtained during the newsgathering process); CAL
CONsT. art. 1, § 2(b) (generally restating the language of section 1070).
7. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d at 794,789 P.2d at 937-38,268 Cal. Rptr. at 75657.
8.
Id. at 805-06, 789 P.2d at 945-46, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65.
9.
id.
10. Id. at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
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newsperson's rights." The California Supreme Court, after finding
the information requested by the defendant nonconfidential and
important to the defendant's case, held that Delaney had a
constitutional right to the reporters' information.12
While the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
first amendment of the Federal Constitution does not provide a
reporter with a privilege against disclosing information obtained in
the newsgathering process, the Court has allowed the states to
establish their own standards within the limits of the first
amendment.3 The Delaney decision, through the use of the
balancing test defined above, establishes a standard to be used by
trial courts in determining a newsperson's rights under California's
shield law. 4 In addition, the Delaney court resolves the recurring
conflict among the appellate courts regarding whether the shield
law applies to nonconfidential as well as confidential
information. 5
Part I of this Note reviews existing case law and California
statutes discussing the shield law, as well as the traditional standard
used in establishing a defendant's right to a fair trial when
confronted with a statute that would preclude certain evidence. 6
Part II examines the rationale and holding of the court in
Delaney.17 Finally, Part III presents the legal ramifications of the
Delaney decision.' 8

11. Id. at 808-12, 789 P.2d at 948-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767-70.
12. Id. at 814-17, 789 P.2d at 952-54, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771-73.
13. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-708 (1972). For a discussion of the evolution of
the common law privilege for newspersons, see generally Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An
Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 Agiz.
L.R. 815, 817-20 (1983).
14. The California shield law, which provides only an immunity from contempt, must be
distinguished from a reporter's privilege, which prohibits all judicial sanctions. New York Times Co.
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 462-64, 796 P.2d 811, 816-18, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 104-06 (1990).
15. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (stating that the scope of the California
shield law includes nonconfidential unpublished information).
16. See infra notes 19-151 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 152-237 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 238-67 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Delaney case illustrates an entanglement of various
constitutional and statutory rights that are asserted both by the
criminal defendant and the newspersons. The defendant asserted his
constitutional right to present a defense and examine witnesses
when he asked the court to compel the newpersons' testimony
regarding their observations of the defendant's arrest. 19 The
newspersons claim that the shield law, detailed in both the
California Evidence Code and the California Constitution, protected
them from forced disclosure of unpublished information.2" Finally,
the appellate court in Delaney held that the shield law did not
apply to the reporters' percipient observations of Delaney's arrest,
so the question remained whether the scope of the shield law
included nonconfidential as well as confidential information.2
In order to comprehend the significance of each of the
constitutional and statutory rights asserted in Delaney, it is
necessary to present the background of each of these asserted
rights, and indicate the deference courts are willing to pay to them.
First, it will be necessary to analyze a criminal defendant's right to
present evidence at trial when countervailing interests, asserted
through statutory or constitutional claims, attempt to exclude
evidence necessary to the defendant's case.' Next, the traditional
rights accorded newspersons through the shield law, as well as
many courts' recognition of a newsperson's qualified first
amendment right to avoid compelled disclosure of sources or
unpublished information, will be examined, with an emphasis on
the development of the shield law in California.' Finally, the
judicial interpretation of the shield law will be analyzed in both the
civil and criminal contexts. 24

19.
(1990).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805-06, 789 P.2d 934, 945-46, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 764-65
Id. at 794-97, 789 P.2d at 93740, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756-59.
See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-51 and accompanying text.

1991 / Delaney v. Superior Court
A. The Accused's ConstitutionalRight to PresentEvidence at Trial
Many states have enacted statutory privileges or other
restrictions which interfere with an accused's right to present
evidence at trial, yet the right to offer the testimony of a witness
has long been equated with the constitutional right to present a
defense'2 Consequently, the Supreme Court of the United States
has declared that many state statutes may be overcome upon a
showing that they unnecessarily interfere with 26defendants'
fundamental right to present witnesses in their behalf.
Since the defendant in Delaney asserted his constitutional right
to present witnesses in his behalf, or, more generally, his right to
a fair trial, it is necessary to examine how the Supreme Court of
the United States first recognized a constitutional right to present
defense evidence.27 Second, statutory and common law privileges
which may impinge the defendant's right to a fair trial should also
be examined to explore the circumstances under which a
defendant's right to a fair trial is found to be outweighed by these
privileges.28 Finally, the defendant's right to a fair trial should be
presented in light of privileges which have constitutional bases,
such as the first amendment guarantee of a free press.29

25. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (holding that the constitutional
guarantee to present a defense includes the right to present witnesses).
26.
See id. at 23 (holding that the defendant's constitutional right to present witnesses
overcame Texas statutes which prohibited defendants from calling witnesses implicated in same
crime); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,302-03 (1973) (holding that a statute which prevented
defendant from impeaching his own witnesses violated defendant's right to due process);
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58-61 (1987) (holding that the defendant's right to a fair trial
dictated that the trial court must conduct an in camera review of psychotherapist-patient records to
determine their materiality).
27.
See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
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1. The Recognition of a Defendant's ConstitutionalRight to
Present a Defense
In Washington v. Texas,3" the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed two Texas statutes which prohibited an accused
from calling, as a defense witness, any person charged or convicted
as a criminal in the same crime.3 The statutes prohibited a
defendant, on trial for murder, from calling as a witness another
man convicted in the same shooting.32 The Court held that the
statutes violated the accused's constitutional guarantee to present
a defense, and concluded that the right of an accused to confront
the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their
testimony also includes the right to present defense witnesses.33
The decision in Washington was reaffirmed by the Court in the
1973 decision of Chambers v. Mississippi.34 In Chambers, a
homicide defendant called a witness to the stand who had
previously confessed to the killing, but subsequently recanted his
admission.35 One of Chambers' defenses to the murder charge was
that the witness, rather than Chambers, had killed the victim. 36
However, under a Mississippi rule of evidence known as the
"voucher" rule, parties to an action could not impeach their own
witnesses.37 Thus, the trial court, in applying the "voucher" rule,
prevented Chambers from calling the witness to the stand for
purposes of cross-examination. 8
This rule effectively precluded the defendant from presenting
exculpatory evidence which would implicate the witness in the
murder. 39 The Supreme Court in Chambers held that the rulings

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Id. at 16-17.
Id.
Id. at 18-19.
410 U.S. 284 (1973).

35.

Id. at 288-89. Chambers had called the witness, McDonald, to testify after the state had

refuszd to
291.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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call McDonald, and made a motion to examine McDonald as an adverse witness. Id. at
Id. at 289.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 295-98.
Id. at 297-98.
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of the trial court precluding Chambers from cross-examining the
witness deprived him of a fair trial and denied him due process of

law.'
The significance of the decisions in Washington and Chambers
is that the decisions arm defendants with a constitutional challenge
to overturn statutes, common law decisions, and court rules which
may exclude relevant evidence for use in their behalf.41 In the
American system of jurisprudence, if conflicts arise between
constitutional provisions and statutes or common law decisions, the
constitutional provisions prevail.42 Therefore, when statutes,
common law decisions, or court rules prevent the admission of
evidence presented on behalf of an accused, the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense necessarily overrides those
assertions that attempt to exclude evidence.43
2. Statutory and Common Law Privileges Which Interfere with
the Right to Presenta Defense
While the defendants in both Washington and Chambersknew
what information was being withheld, courts have reacted
differently when evidence is requested by the defense in
preparation for trial, without knowledge of the content of the

40. Id. at 302-03.
41. See IMWINKELREID, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE § 1-2 (1990) (indicating that Washington
and Chambershave had a significant effect on the decisions of even the conservative Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, leading the courts to uphold the constitutional right to present defense evidence,
as announced by Chief Justice Warren in Washington). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 31920 (1974) (holding that a criminal defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment necessitate the disclosure of confidential juvenile convictions relevant to the defendant's
defense). Davis is often cited when a defendant's efforts to impeach a prosecution witness are
thwarted by an evidentiary privilege. Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and
Compulsory ProcessRights Against Statutory CommunicationPrivilege,30 STAN. L REV. 934, 95960 (1978). In Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), the Court held that the trial judge's refusal
to allow cross-examination which was designed to establish the witness' bias violated defendant's
confrontational guarantee under the Sixth Amendment. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-33.
42. See IMwINEIREI, supra note 41, at § 11-1 (stating that constitutional rights are "of a
higher order" than statutory rights). See also 16 CJ.S. ConstitutionalLaw §§ 86-87, 94, 107-08
(1984) (stating that courts have a duty to insure legislation does not affect the federal constitutional
rights of the people).
43. See Imwunium , supra note 41, at § 1-2 (discussing the direct and indirect
consequences flowing from recognition of constitutional right to present defense evidence).
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evidence. Commonly, this situation arises when a party asserts a
statutory or common law privilege to avoid disclosure of certain
information. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,' the Supreme Court of
the United States was forced to resolve the conflict that can arise
between a defendant's right to a fair trial and an individual's
statutorily enforced privilege against compulsion of certain
evidence.45
]En Ritchie, the defendant, accused of sexually abusing his minor
child, subpoenaed documents from the Pennsylvania Children and
Youth Services (CYS) agency, which had investigated the
charges.46 CYS claimed the records were privileged under a state
statute and refused to comply with the subpoena.47 The trial judge,
acknowledging he had not read the agency's entire file, denied the
defendant's motion to produce the documents.43
The Supreme Court focused on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which prior case law had recognized as
including a fundameital right to a fair trial.49 The Court, while
acknowledging the public interest in preserving the confidential
investigatory information gathered by a private agency, concluded
that the privilege was not an absolute one.5" The Court remanded
the case to the trial court to determine whether the information
should be admitted into evidence under the protection of an in
camera review. 5 The Court concluded that the defendant had no
right to inspect the information himself, because that would
undermine the public interest in protecting child abuse
information.52 In ascertaining the admissibility of the information,
the Court instructed the trial court to examine whether the agency's

44.
45.
46.

480 U.S. 39 (1987).
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 43.

47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 44.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 60.
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file "contains information that probably would have changed the
outcome of [the] trial." 3
Justice Powell, in a portion of the opinion joined by only three
members of the Court, stated that the sixth amendment right to
confront witnesses is a "trial right," and that none of the Court's
precedents supported the view that the confrontation clause
necessarily compels pretrial discovery. 4 Justice Powell
distinguished the right to offer evidence at trial from the right to
seek evidence that is not known or otherwise discoverable.55
Justice Powell concluded that the confrontation clause only
guarantees the defendant an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in "every
, 56
way.
The right of a criminal defendant to overcome an assertion of
a privilege has also been addressed by a California appellate court
in People v. Caplan." In Caplan, the defendant was convicted of
engaging in sexual activity with a five-year-old girl.5" During
pretrial motions, the defendant requested discovery of the girl's
psychotherapy records from her therapists and, at trial, sought to
cross-examine the girl regarding the statements she made to the
therapists. 9 The trial court, acknowledging the relevance of the
requested information, denied discovery of the records, citing the
patient-psychotherapist privilege.'
On appeal, the Caplan court held that the defendant was
entitled to have the trial court inspect the victim's psychotherapy
records to determine whether the information would assist the
defendant's case-in-chief. 1 The court concluded that Caplan's

53. Id. at 58.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 53-54.
56. Id. at 53.
57. 193 Cal. App. 3d 543, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1987).
58. Id. at 545-46, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 478-79.
59. Id. at 554-55, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
60. Id. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1991) (stating that a patient has a privilege
to refuse to disclose, or prevent another from disclosing, certain confidential communications between
a patient and a psychotherapist).
61. People v. Caplan, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 558, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
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right to the records was mandated by his constitutional right to
cross-examine and confront witnesses, and ordered an in camera
review to determine the relevance of the records.62 The court
added that constitutional due process compels the prosecution to
provide evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused
and material in determining the guilt of the defendant.63
IWhile the Caplan court gave some deference to the statutorily
created psychotherapist privilege, courts necessarily give greater
deference to federal constitutional provisions which interfere with
an accused's federal constitutional right to present a defense, since
the supremacy clause is not implicated. Although the Delaney case
addresses the California shield law provision, it is necessary to
address the federal constitutional rights of the criminal defendant
in light of the federal first amendment protection afforded
newspersons in many states which recognize a nonstatutory shield
law. The cases examined will demonstrate the extent of the federal
first amendment rights afforded reporters, and how many courts
recognize such a right.
B. A Newsperson's First Amendment
Information

Right to

Withhold

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of . . . the press . . . ."' It is generally agreed that,
unless a constitutional right to gather news exists, the free flow of
information to the public will be inhibited. 65 A testimonial

62. Id. at 558, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
63. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. The importance of the reporter's privilege in light of the first amendment, particularly in
regard to compelling a reporter to reveal confidential sources, was explained in Zerilil v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705 (1981). The court stated:
"The First Amendment guarantees a free press primarily because of the important role
it can play as a vital source of public information... Without an unfettered press, citizens
would be far less able to make informed political, social, and economic choices. But the
press' function as a vital source of information is weakened whenever the ability of
journalists to gather news is impaired. Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of
a source may significantly interfere with this news gathering ability; journalists frequently

1380
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privilege for newspersons under the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press was first recognized in Garlandv. Torre.'
In Torre, actress Judy Garland brought a defamation suit against
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for statements allegedly
made by a CBS executive and published in the New York Herald
Tribune.67 The trial court held the reporter in contempt for
refusing to identify the source of the statement quoted in the
article.68 Writing for the majority, Judge (later Justice) Potter
Stewart explicitly recognized a privilege to not disclose, noting the
chilling effect forced disclosure may have on the freedom of the
press.69 Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff's
right to present evidence outweighed the reporter's qualified first
amendment privilege. 70 Despite the recognition in Torre of a
privilege for the press, few other courts recognized a first
amendment privilege for reporters.71 The confusion among the
lower courts, caused by the Torre decision and a growing number
of subpoenas for reporters, forced the Supreme Court of the United
States to address whether the first amendment may shield a reporter
from compelled testimony.
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 72 the Court addressed four different
cases, consolidated for purposes of determining whether there exists
a qualified first amendment right to withhold information. 73 The
four cases shared one common characteristic: in each case a grand
jury sought information regarding a crime which a reporter

depend on informants to gather news, and confidentiality is often essential to establishing
a relationship with an informant."
Id. at 710-11.
66. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
67. Id. at 545.
68. Id. at 547.
69. Id. at 548.
70. Id. at 550.
71. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 251, 436 P.2d 729, 732 (1968), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 905 (1968). See also Comment, The Newsman's PrivilegeAfter Branzburg: The Casefor
a FederalShield Law, 24 U.C.LA. L Rnv. 160, 170 (1976) (describing the pre-Torre evolution of
the reporters' privilege).
72. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
73. See In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604,266 N.E. 2d 297 (1971); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.
2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W. 2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). Defendant
Hayes was Judge Pound's successor. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 n.3.
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witnessed and subsequently wrote about.74 In Branzburg, Justice
White, writing for the plurality, concluded that the first amendment
does not provide newspersons with even a qualified privilege
against appearing before a grand jury and being compelled to
answer questions as to either the identity of news sources or
information received therefrom." The plurality, however, stated
that it was permissible for states to enact legislation that would
allow the states to fashion their own standards within the
limitations of the first amendment, and to recognize a privilege,
either qualified or absolute, for reporters.76 In opposition, Justice
Douglas in a dissenting opinion stated that the First Amendment
affords a newsperson an absolute immunity. 7 In another
dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, writing for himself and two
other justices, would have found a qualified privilege under the
78
first amendment.
74. Branzburg v: Hayes, 408 U.S. at 670-79.
75.
Id. at 690. Justice White acknowledged that news gathering qualified for some first
amendment protection. Id. at 681. Justice White also indicated that the reporter's first amendment
interest in avoiding testimony before grand juries was too insubstantial to overcome the public
interest in prosecuting crime. Id. at 695. Finally, in recognizing that the Constitution does not allow
grand juries to harass the press, Justice White concluded that the judges supervising grand juries
would be sufficiently sensitive to the first amendment to minimize the danger of abuse. Id. at 707-08.
While the Branzburg decision centered on the rights of reporters with regard to grand jury
proceedings, Justice White indicated that the Court's holding was applicable to criminal trials as well,
stating that the public interest in law enforcement may override reporters' "consequential but
uncertain" right to withhold information. Id. at 690-91.
76. Id. at 706. The plurality added that it was "powerless" in preventing state courts from
recognizing a qualified or absolute privilege under their own state constitutions. Id. Justice Powell,
in a concurring opinion, attempted to limit the nature of the plurality's holding by stating that "[t]he
asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct." Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). The Branzburg decision has been widely
criticized by commentators. See TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTiUTMONAL LAw § 12-22, at 972-76 (1988)
(stating that the qualified privilege rejected in Branzburg is mandated by the first amendment's
"implicit guarantee against undue interference with the acquisition of knowledge"); Comment, Sixth
Amendment Limitationson the Newsperson'sPrivilege:A Breach in the Shield, 13 RUrTERs LJ.361,
367 (1982) (stating that the Branzburg decision was "at best, vague and, at worst, opaque"); Marcus,
supra note 13, at 836-37 (stating that discovering with certainty the meaning of the Branzburg
opinion is extremely difficult).
77. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 738-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, held that in order to compel a reporter to testify before a grand jury, the government must
demonstrate: (1) That there was probable cause that the reporter had information clearly relevant to
a specific probable violation of law; (2) that the information sought could not be obtained from an

1382

1991 / Delaney v. Superior Court
The judiciary's early reaction to Branzburg was to conclude
that, by denying the reporter's a privilege, the plurality disposed of
any rights of the media in the criminal context.7 9 However,
several state and federal judges disagreed with this view and have

interpreted Branzburg to confer a qualified privilege even in grand
jury proceedings.80 Many judges have held that, based on Justice

Powell's concurring opinion, that courts should balance the
freedom of the press under the federal first amendment with the
obligation of citizens to give relevant testimony related to criminal
conduct.8 Currently, twenty-eight states have enacted statutes,
designated generally as shield laws, which serve to protect
information gathered by reporters by declaring reporters immune
from giving pertinent testimony. 2
While California is among the states which have enacted such
shield laws, California courts have also recognized a qualified first
amendment privilege for newspersons. 83 In KSDO v. Superior

alternative source less intrusive on first amendment rights; and (3) that there is a compelling and
overriding interest in the information. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
79. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 839 (citing In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259,394 A.2d 330 (1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)).
80. Id. While the holding in Branzburgcould arguably apply only to grand jury proceedings,
Justice White in dicta indicated that the plurality's holding was also applicable to criminal trials.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91. See TRaNE, supra note 76, at 976 (stating that the Branzburg case
represents a rejection of any first amendment privilege for reporters). See generally J. BARRON AND
C. DIENEs, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PREss § 8:6 (1979) (discussing the postBranzburg developments in regard to assertion of reporters' privileges in criminal trials).
81. See, e.g., State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974). In St. Peter,the court
stated that a television news reporter had a right under the First Amendment to refuse disclosure of
certain information, absent a showing by the criminal defendant that no alternative sources exist and
that the information is material and relevant. Id., 315 A.2d at 256. See also Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489,492 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (stating that "ifone aligns Justice
Powell's concurring opinion with Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
and with Justice Douglas' dissent, a majority of five justices accepted the proposition that journalists
are entitled to at least a qualified First Amendment privilege"). For a detailed analysis of the impact
of the Branzburg decision, see generally Marcus, supra note 13, at 821-50.
82. A Shift Toward StrongerShields, Nat'l L.J., May 28, 1990 at 3. These states are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Id.
Many states which have not expressly enacted shield laws have created the functional equivalent. Id.
83. The California Supreme Court recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege for
reporters in a defamation action in Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208
Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984). See supra notes 64-92 and accompanying text (discussing Branzburgand other
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Court," the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
undertook a federal first amendment analysis after finding that the
newspersons were not protected by the California shield law.' 5 In
KSDO, members of a local police department brought a libel action
against a radio station and a newspaper after a broadcaster stated
that the department was under investigation for transporting
heroin. 6 A newspaper repeated the broadcast in an article, adding
that corruption extended to the highest levels of the department. 7
The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of
the' sources used for the stories."8 The court stated that the
California shield law "is an immunity from contempt, not a
privilege against disclosure," and therefore, since the defendants
were neither threatened with nor cited for contempt, the California
shield law immunity was inapplicable. 9 However, the court,
citing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg, set forth
a balancing test that considered: (1) the nature of the particular
proceeding; (2) whether the newsperson is a party or nonparty; (3)
whether there are alternative sources for the information; and (4)
whether the requested information goes to the heart of the claim."°
The court found that there had been no showing by the plaintiffs
that the information sought was unavailable from another source or
that the materials were at the heart of the plaintiffs' claim, and
therefore held that the qualified privilege under the first amendment

cases addressing whether a reporter has a qualified first amendment right to withhold unpublished
information).
84. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
85. Id. at 384-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17. Other California appellate courts recognizing a
federal first amendment privilege for reporters include Rosato v. SuperiorCourt, 51 Cal. App. 3d
190, 212-16, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 441-44 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); CBS, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 252-53, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427-28 (1978); and HallWssy v.
SuperiorCourt, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045-46, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638-39 (1988).
86. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 378, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 212.

87.

Id.

88. Id. at 379, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
89. Id. at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
90. Id. at 385-86, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring)). While the KSDO court expressly recognized Justice Powell's
concurring opinion, a similar balancing test was actually set forth in Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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shielded the defendants from compelled disclosure. 9' While the
court in KSDO considered the federal first amendment rights of
newspersons to withhold privileged information, other California
courts have proceeded only under the newsperson's shield law
immunity recognized in a California statute and state constitutional
provision.
C. The History of the California Shield Law
California's shield law was first enacted in 1935.' The statute,
codified as section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provided
in pertinent part that newspaper employees could not be held in
contempt of court for refusing to disclose their sources to courts,
the legislature, or another administrative body. 93 Unfortunately,
very little legislative history was provided for section 1881, and
since its inception courts have struggled with interpreting its
intended purpose. 94 The modem shield law is currently codified

in Evidence Code section 1070. 95 A 1974 amendment expanded

91. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
92. 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 532, sec. 1, at 1608-10 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190,218-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,446
(1975) (interpreting the shield law as not protective of reporters who observe a crime).
95. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 299 sec. 2, at 1297, 1323-35 (enacting CAL EVID. CODE § 1070). The
Civil Procedure section was relocated to the Evidence Code in 1965, becoming effective in 1967.7
CAL. L. REVISION COMM. REP. REc. & STUDIES 912, 913 (1965).
The text of section 1070, as amended in 1974, reads as follows:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire
service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in
contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the
power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as defined in Section
901, the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for
publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or
processing of information for communication to the public.
(b) Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or
employed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected or
employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any
information procured while so connected or employed for news or news commentary
purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for

1385

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
the shield law to protect against the compelled disclosure of
"unpublished information" as well as sources responsible for
divulging such information.'
Particularly troubling to the courts is the clause providing that
a reporter "cannot be adjudged for contempt" for refusing to
disclose certain information.' Several appellate courts have
interpreted this immunity as equivalent to an evidentiary
privilege.98 Support for a broad interpretation of the shield law
comes from other states that enacted shield laws prior to California
for protection purposes rather than punishment." In light of the
prevailing view that the legislative intent behind the shield law was
impeded by the power of the courts, the legislature attempted to
reinforce the importance of the shield law by amending the
California Constitution."

communication to the public.
(c) As used in this section, "unpublished information" includes information not
disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not
related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes,
outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the
public through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based
upon or related to such material has been disseminated.
Id.
96. 1974 Cal. Stat. ch. 1323, sec. 1, at 2877 (amending CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070); 1974 Cal,
Stat. ch. 1456, sec. 2, at 3183 (amending CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070).
97. CAL. EvIn. CODE § 1070(a) (West Supp. 1991). See, e.g., KSDO v. Superior Court, 136
Cal. App. 3d 375, 379-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211,216-18 (1982) (stating that the California shield law
immunity applies only if a reporter has been cited for or threatened with a contempt citation).
98. See, e.g., Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 396-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
612-14 (1979) (recognizing section 1070 of the Evidence Code as creating a statutory privilege for
reporters); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1978)
(stating that statute granting privilege to reporters did not preclude compelled disclosure of video and
audio tapes of drug transactions); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 216 n.17, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 427, 444 n.17 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (stating that the labeling of the shield
law as an immunity rather than a privilege is of no importance).
99. See generally Note, The Newsgatherer's Shield-Why Waste Space in the California
Constitution? 15 Sw. U.L REv. 527, 539 (1985) (broad construction of California's shield law
appropriate since shield law provides reporters with a general immunity from contempt, rather than
prohibiting the discovery of certain categories of material). Two states enacted shield laws prior to
California: Maryland (1896) and New Jersey (1933). Id. (citing 6 CAL. LAW REVisION COMM. REP.,
REc. & STuDIEs 481, 486 (1964)).
10D. Note, supra note 99, at 545.
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1. Elevation of the Shield Law to ConstitutionalStatus
In 1978, the California Assembly proposed an amendment to
section 2 of article I of the California Constitution, relating to
freedom of the press."' This proposition was in response to two
decisions in which courts indicated that legislators were infringing
upon the internal processes of the courts, an area in which judges
claimed exclusive authority."° A California appellate court
expressed this sentiment in Farr v. Superior Court,0 3 which
addressed the applicability of the shield law statute to judicial
bodies. The Farr court held that the shield law did not apply to
violations of orders issued by the court which bar potentially
prejudicial pretrial publicity. 4 The court declared that the courts
had exclusive authority in areas of internal processes, and that the
shield law unconstitutionally interfered with the power and duty of
the court. 5 In addition' to correcting the detrimental effect
resulting from decisions such as Farr,legislators wanted to restate
the aim and importance of the shield law in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision regarding the scope of reporters'
the federal first amendment in Branzburg v.
rights under
06
1
Hayes.
On June 3, 1980, the voters approved Proposition 5,107 which
amended the California Constitution, article I, section 2, by adding
subdivision (b), which contains language virtually identical to

101. Id at 545.
102. Id. (citing Rosato v. Superior Court,51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farrv. SuperiorCourt,22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972)).
103. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
104. Id. at 71, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
105. Id. (citing Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1961)). In Shepard, the Court stated that
trial courts have a constitutional power to issue contempt citations with which the legislature may
not interfere. Shepard, 384 U.S. at 350-51.
106. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing the
Branzburg decision).
107. Proposition 5 was passed by a 73.3% majority. Note, supra note 99, at 527, n.1.
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Evidence Code section 1070."18 While the amendment was
designed to clarify and strengthen the purpose behind section 1070,
subsequent decisions by California courts which attempted to
interpret the constitutional provision indicated continued confusion
regarding the applicability and scope of the shield law immunity.
For example, several California appellate courts had refused to
recognize that "nonconfidential" information was protected under
the shield law, despite clear language to the contrary. 9
D. JudicialInterpretationof the Shield Law
When newspersons claim an immunity from disclosure under
the shield law, a major factor in courts' decisions to recognize the
immunity is the type of proceeding for which the information is
requested. For instance, a plaintiff in a civil action wishing to
overcome the newsperson's shield law will face greater obstacles
than a criminal defendant, since the criminal defendant has a sixth

108.

Article I, section 2(b) of the California Constitution provides:
A publisher, editor, reporter... shall not be adjudged in contempt.., for refusing
to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for
publication... or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or
prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the
public.
Nor shall a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or
employed by a radio or television station... be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to
disclose the source of any information ... or for refusing to disclose any unpublished
information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for
communication to the public.
As used in this subdivision, 'unpublished information' includes information not
disseminated to the public... and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes,
photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public
through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon
or related to such material has been disseminated.

Id.
109. See Liggett v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 420, 423-24, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171-72
(1989), review grantedandopinion superseded,788 P.2d 34,263 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1989) (stating that
a reporter's eyewitness observations of a public event are not protected by the shield law); Delaney
v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681,689, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60,65-66 (1988) aff'd, 50 Cal. 3d 785,
789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990) (stating that the shield law was enacted to protect
confidential sources); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241,250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421,426
(1973) (restricting application of the shield law to confidential information).
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amendment right to a fair trial and to present evidence. 1 ' While
the Delaney decision addresses the rights of criminal defendants,
examining the manner in which California courts have treated the
rights of reporters under the shield law in both the criminal and
civil contexts is helpful in understanding the reasoning of the
Delaney decision and the implications of the decision in regard to
future shield law cases.1 '
1. Civil Case Law
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court,"2 the Court
of Appeal for the Second District addressed the rights of a civil
litigant in compelling the disclosure of information possessed by a
magazine. In Playboy, two entertainers sued their managers for
inducing them to enter into an unfavorable movie contract, as well
as for breaching the fiduciary relationship owed to the
entertainers." 3 The entertainers discussed incidents relating to the
case in an interview with Playboy Magazine, and the managers
sought the unpublished materials in Playboy's possession relating
to the interview, claiming they could be used to impeach the
plaintiffs' credibility.' The trial court granted the requested
order for discovery." 5
The Playboy court noted that the shield law protects
unpublished information regardless of whether published
information had been disseminated, adding that published material
that can be confirmed, amplified, or discredited by undisseminated
source material is considered to be "based upon" the
undisseminated source material, and subject to protection." 6 The
Playboy court stated that the inclusion of the shield immunity in

110. See infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text (noting California decisions which address
rights of criminal defendants in light of shield law).
I11. For an analysis of the interaction between the California legislature and the media, see
generally Sylvester, How California Governs the Media, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 381 (1986).
112. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
113. Id. at 18, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 23, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
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the constitution was intended to give reporters "the highest level
of protection under the state law.".. 7 Furthermore, the court
stated that permitting litigants to compel nonparty newspersons to
present their information to the trial court for inspection, balancing
of interests, and probable disclosure, would greatly reduce the
protection afforded newspersons."' The court concluded that civil
litigants do not have sixth amendment or due process rights to
trigger a balancing process between themselves and reporters.' 19
Noting the unqualified nature of the shield law, the court held that
1 20
the magazine's materials were protected.
Following the decision in Playboy, the California Supreme
21
Court, in Mitchell v. Superior Court,1
examined for the first
time the scope of the amended Evidence Code section 1070 and the
addition of the shield law to the California Constitution. 12 In
Mitchell, the court addressed a defamation action brought against
several parties concerning an article in Reader's Digest discussing
Pulitzer Prize-winning reports by two reporters, David and Cathy
Mitchell.2 2 The plaintiffs requested the Mitchells to produce all
documents containing information connected with the series of
articles. 24 The Mitchells claimed that the shield law, or, in the
alternative, the first amendment, permitted them to withhold certain
information gathered in preparing the story in question." 5 The
trial court, in compelling disclosure by the Mitchells, stated that the

117. Id. at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 29, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
120. Id.
121. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
122. Since parties to a civil action are subject to sanctions beyond a contempt citation, from
which a reporter is immunized under the California shield law, the Mitchell court also proceeded to
analyze the reporters' rights to avoid disclosure under the first amendment. Id. at 274-84, 690 P.2d
at 628-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155-62.
123. Id. at 272-73, 690 P.2d at 626-27, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54. The plaintiffs, members of
the Synanon Church, claimed the articles by the Mitchells, which addressed the church's drug
rehabilitation program, implied that the plaintiffs' program was unsuccessful. Id.
124. Id. at 273, 690 P.2d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154. The plaintiffs' requests to produce
documents listed nearly 40 documents. Id.
125. Id.
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did not affect a
inclusion of the shield law in the constitution
126
litigation.
the
to
party
a
is
who
reporter
The Mitchell court first noted that the Mitchells' refusal to
comply with the trial court's order to produce the documents did
not implicate California's shield law, which merely provides an
immunity from contempt, not a protection from sanctions. 27 The
court then addressed the Mitchells' nonstatutory claim that the first
amendment and the free speech provisions contained in article I of
the California Constitution provided a qualified privilege against
disclosure.1 2' The court, acknowledging the nonstatutory claims
of the Mitchells, formulated a balancing test to determine when a
reporter must reveal confidential information. 129 First, the court
stated that disclosure is normally appropriate, particularly when a
reporter is a party to the litigation. 13 Second, the court required
a showing that the requested information goes to the "heart of the
Third, the court
case" of the party seeking discovery.'
determined that the party seeking the unpublished information must
32
exhaust all alternative sources before compelling disclosure.
Finally, the court stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of preserving the confidentiality of the unpublished
information or source. 33 The court, noting the plaintiffs' failure
to demonstrate a search for available alternatives and the lack of
specificity in the plaintiffs' claims for the Mitchells' information,
from enforcing the discovery orders
prohibited the trial court
34
against the Mitchells.

126. Id. at 273-74, 690 P.2d at 627-28, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
127. Id. at 274, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
128. Id. The Mitchells also claimed a common law reporter's privilege. Id. The court rejected
this claim, noting that Evidence Code section 911 precludes courts from establishing a common law
privilege in California, by providing that "except as otherwise provided by statute... [n]o person
has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to produce any writing, object, or other
thing." Id. (citing Evidence Code section 911). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1966).
129. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d at 279-83, 690 P.2d at 631-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
158-62.
130. Id. at 279, 690 P.2d at 631,208 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
131. Id. at 280-82, 690 P.2d at 632-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-61.
132. Id. at 282, 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
133. Id. at 282-83, 690 P.2d at 633-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
134. Id. at 283-84, 690 P.2d at 634-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
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Following the decisions in Playboy and Mitchell, reporters'
interests in avoiding compelled disclosure appeared well protected.
The Playboy decision provided that, under the California shield
law, reporters have an absolute right to withhold information when
threatened with contempt. 135 Following Playboy, the Mitchell
court held that, in the case where the shield law is not applicable,
courts will recognize a qualified first amendment privilege, and
balance the competing interests of the parties. 136 However, the
decisions in Playboy and Mitchell discuss civil cases, which
address entirely different rights than criminal actions. The Mitchell
court illustrated this difference, stating that the balancing factors
were applicable only to civil cases, since "[i]n criminal
proceedings, both the interests of the state in law enforcement
... and the interest of the defendant in discovering exonerating
evidence outweigh any interest asserted in ordinary civil
litigation. ' 137 In contrast to the right of a civil litigant to compel
disclosure of information protected by the shield law immunity or
a qualified privilege, the right of a criminal defendant to compel
disclosure of this information is afforded greater deference in light
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the defendant's right
138
to present a defense.
2. Criminal Case Law
In Hammarley v. Superior Court,139 a criminal defendant's
right to present evidence was found to outweigh a reporter's right
to withhold information.' In Hammarley, a homicide defendant
requested unpublished information from a reporter who interviewed

135. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Playboy decision, which
held that a magazine's materials were protected under the shield law).
136. See supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell case and
delineating the balancing test).
137. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 278, 690 P.2d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
138. See supranotes 25-63 and accompanying text (illustrating the rights ofcriminal defendants
in light of evidentiary privileges which interfere with their right to present a defense).
139. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979) (disapproved by Delaney v. Superior
Court,50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990)).
140. id. at 402-03, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
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the prosecutor's key witness for articles published in a newspaper
and magazine. 1 ' The defendant claimed that the information was
necessary to impeach the credibility of the witness, who had
implicated the defendant and others in the killing.142 The
Hammarley court placed the burden on the parties seeking to avoid
the privilege to demonstrate: (1) That the evidence sought is
relevant and necessary to the case; (2) that the evidence is not
available from a source less intrusive to the privilege; and (3) that
143
the evidence is likely to lead to the defendant's exoneration.
Finding that the defendant had met this burden, the court affirmed
the trial court's contempt order against the reporter, in order to
protect the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.'"
While the court in Hammarley found the defendant's interests
in the unpublished information outweighed the reporter's asserted
protection against disclosure under the shield law, a criminal
defendant's right to compel such disclosure is not absolute. For
example, in Hallissy v. Superior Court,141 the Court of Appeal for
the First District found that a homicide defendant's right to present
evidence did not outweigh a reporter's assertion of immunity under
the shield law. 146 In Hallissy, a reporter interviewed the
defendant, charged with three counts of first degree murder, and
wrote a newspaper article in which the defendant confessed that he
was a paid killer. 47 The defendant, attempting to discredit the
accuracy of the published statements, subpoenaed the reporter to
testify regarding the interview and produce her notes, in order to
prove contradictions in the defendant's statements made during the
interview. 141
The Hallissy court, using the analysis set forth in Hammarley,
stated that the defendant failed to meet his burden in overcoming

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
Court, 50
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 393, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
Id.
Id. at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
Id. at 401-04, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615-17.
200 Cal. App. 3d 1038,248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988) (disapprovedby Delaney v. Superior
Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753).
Id. at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
Id. at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
Id.
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the reporter's shield law inuUnity. 49 The court concluded that
the defendant's admission that other individuals heard his
confessions and could testify as to its truth or falsity was
significant in determining that the defendant failed to show that
less intrusive alternatives could not be utilized. 5 ' Moreover, the
defendant's admission showed that the information was
unnecessary to his case, and would not lead to his exoneration."'
Therefore, following the decisions in Hammarley and Hallissy, the
burden a California court would place on a criminal defendant to
overcome the shield law would be to show that there was a lack of
available alternatives for the information, that the information was
necessary and relevant to the defendant's case, and that the
information was likely to lead to the defendant's exoneration.
Prior to Delaney, numerous conflicts arose among California
appellate courts regarding the scope and application of the shield
law. Issues such as the application of the shield law to
nonconfidential information, the classification of the shield law as
a privilege versus an immunity, and the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of the application of the shield law to a criminal
defendant remained unanswered. Also undecided was whether the
federal first amendment provided newspersons with additional
ammunition in avoiding compelled disclosure.
II. THE CASE
In Delaney v. Superior Court,'52 the California Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant's constitutional
right to present a defense may overcome a reporter's shield law
immunity.' 53 The court set forth a four-part balancing test to
guide trial courts in resolving a conflict between a reporter's right
15 4
to withhold information and a defendant's right to a fair trial.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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Id. at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.

Id.
Id.
50 Cal. 3d 785; 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990), reh'g denied.
Id. at 792-93, 789 P.2d at 936-37, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
Id. at 807-13, 789 P.2d at 947-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766-70.
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The court also resolved a conflict among the appellate courts as to
whether the shield law applies to nonconfidential as well as
confidential information.155 Despite concluding that the reporters'
unpublished, nonconfidential information was protected under the
shield law, the Delaney court held that the defendant's federal
constitutional right to a fair trial outweighed the rights asserted by
the reporters under the shield law.156
A. The Facts
On September 23, 1987, Los Angeles Times reporter Roxana
Kopetman and photographer Roberto Santiago Bertero were
accompanying members of a Long Beach Police Department task
force on patrol when they observed defendant Sean Delaney and15a7
companion sitting on a bench in the Long Beach Plaza Mall.
The officers asked Delaney about a plastic bag, the type commonly
used for storing drugs, which protruded from his shirt pocket.158
Delaney showed the officers that the bag contained a piece of gold
and jewelry which he claimed he was planning to sell at the
mall. 159
Since there were no pawnshops at the mall, the officers became
suspicious, and asked Delaney for his identification."6 According
to the officers, as Delaney reached for the jacket next to him to get
his wallet, the officers asked to search the jacket for weapons, and
Delaney consented. 6 An officer felt a hard object in the pocket
of the jacket, reached inside, and retrieved a set of brass knuckles,
which Delaney claimed was a key chain.162 Delaney was charged
with a misdemeanor for the possession of brass
knuckles in
163
violation of section 12020(a) of the Penal Code.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 796-805, 789 P.2d at 939-45, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758-64.
Id. at 807-13, 789 P.2d at 947-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766-70.
Id. at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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An article about the task force appeared in the Los Angeles
The article included information
Times four days later."
regarding the police contact with Delaney but did not discuss
whether Delaney had consented to the search of his jacket
pocket.165 At a preliminary hearing, Delaney moved to suppress
the evidence of the brass knuckles on the grounds that the search
of his jacket was nonconsensual, and that the seizure of the brass
knuckles was illegal because the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion."
Delaney subpoenaed the reporters to testify on his behalf at the
suppression hearing. 67 The reporters moved to quash the
subpoenas, claiming that they could not be compelled to testify
about facts relating to their eyewitness observation, because such
facts constituted "unpublished information" and were therefore
protected under section 1070 of the California Evidence Code. 68
The trial judge denied the motions, and after testimony by the
officers at the suppression hearing, the reporters were called by the
prosecution to testify. 69 Having acknowledged that they
possessed pertinent information regarding the nature of the search,
the reporters nevertheless refused to answer any questions relating
specifically to Delaney's consent to the search. 170
The municipal court held that the shield law did not apply to
the eyewitness observations by the reporters of the search and
seizure. 171 Furthermore, the court reasoned that, even if the shield
law applied, the need for the reporters' neutral testimony on the
consent issue outweighed any claim protected under the shield
law. 172 As a result, the reporters were cited for contempt.173
The reporters filed a petition seeking habeas corpus relief, which

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
Id.
Id. at 793-94, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 794, 789 P.2d at 937-38, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
Id. at 794, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
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was granted by a superior court judge, who interpreted the shield
law as granting a reporter immunity from any testimony. 74
Following an appeal by Delaney and the state, the Court of Appeal
for the Second District ordered the superior court to vacate the
order granting the petitions for habeas corpus relief, finding that the
does not extend to percipient observations of a public
shield law
75
event. 1
B. The Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by
Justice Eagleson, 176 affirmed the decision of the court of appeal,
finding that while the reporter's shield law was applicable, any
rights conferred upon the reporters through Evidence Code section
1070 and the California Constitution were outweighed by the
defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial. 177 In
reaching this conclusion, the majority first discussed whether the
shield law's definition of "unpublished information" includes
newpersons' unpublished, nonconfidential observations of
occurrences in public places. 7 ' Next, the majority addressed
Delaney's constitutional right to a fair trial. 179 The majority then
set forth a balancing test to be used in determining when a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial compels disclosure of
information protected by the shield law. i80 Finally, the majority
applied the balancing test to the facts surrounding Delaney's case

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Justices Mosk and Broussard filed concurring opinions. Id.at 817-22, 789 P.2d at 954-58,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 773-77 (Mosk, J., concurring); id. at 822-25, 789 P.2d at 958-60, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
777-79 (Broussard, J., concurring).
177. Id.at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 952-54, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771-73. For purposes of convenience,
the Delaney court referred to article I, section 2(b) of the California constitution while discussing the
shield law, rather than the virtually identical language located in Evidence Code section 1070. Id. at
796 n.4, 789 P.2d at 939 n.4, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758 n.4.
178. Id. at 796-805, 789 P.2d at 939-45, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758-64.
179. Id. at 805-07, 789 P.2d at 945-47, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764-66.
180. Id. at 807-13, 789 P.2d at 947-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766-70.

1397

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
and concluded that Delaney's right to a fair trial outweighed those
rights afforded the reporters under the shield law."18
1. The Shield Law Protects Unpublished, Nonconfidential
Information
The defendant argued that the shield law's protections did not
extend to nonconfidential unpublished information that was
obtained through the reporters' eyewitness observations.1 12 To
determine whether the shield law affords protection to
nonconfidential unpublished information, the majority began by
simply looking to the express terms of the statute and amendments
to the constitution.8 3 Noting that the language provides that a
newsperson shall be immune from contempt for "refusing to
disclose any unpublished information," 184 the majority found that
excluding "nonconfidential" information from the protection of the
shield law would be contrary to the intent of the legislature and
voters in enacting the law.185 The history of the shield law would
only reflect the legislative and voting intent, which may be deduced
by looking at the face of the statute or constitutional amendment
181. Id. at 814-17, 789 P.2d at 952-54, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771-73.
182. Id. at 799-800, 789 P.2d at 941-42, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61.
183. Id. at 798-800, 789 P.2d at 940-42, 268 Cal Rptr. at 759-61. See supra note 95 (presenting
the full text of Evidence Code section 1070, virtually identical to article I, section 2(b) of the
California Constitution).
184. See supra notes 95 (citing full text of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; see also supra note 108
(citing full text of CAL. CONST. Art. I § 2(b)).
185. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d at 798-803, 789 P.2d at 940-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
759-63. The majority also stated that, contrary to the findings of several appellate courts, the shield
law provides only an immunity from contempt, not a privilege. Id. at 797-98 n.6, 789 P.2d at 939-40
n.6, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59 n.6 (disapproving Hanimarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388,
396-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612-14 (1979), and CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241,
250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1978)). Since the shield law is classified as an immunity from
contempt, reporters asserting their rights under the shield law will only be protected from a contempt
citation, whereas a privilege would protect the reporter from other judicial sanctions as well. Id. The
distinction between an immunity and privilege became highly relevant in New York Times v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990), in which nonparty reporters were
ordered by the trial court to produce photographs taken of an automobile accident in a personal injury
action. New York Times, 51 Cal. 3d at 456-58, 796 P.2d at 812-13, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100. The
California Supreme Court held that, since the shield law provides only an immunity from contempt,
the reporters disobeying the subpoena to produce the photographs were subject to monetary sanctions.
Id. at 462-64, 796 P.2d at 816-18, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103-05.
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when its language is unambiguous.186 The majority concluded
that the appellate court had wrongly decided that the shield law
only applies to confidential information.187
2. Delaney's ConstitutionalRight to a FairTrial
While the majority rejected the claim made by both the
prosecution and the defense that the shield law did not apply to
nonconfidential information, this finding was not dispositive of the
case."'8 The majority first explained that the shield law is
necessarily overcome by a showing that a defendant's federal
constitutional right to a fair trial has been violated.' 89 The
majority also indicated that the incorporation of the shield law into
the California Constitution has no bearing on the defendant's
federal constitutional rights."9 Therefore, the court stated, the
supremacy clause dictates that federal constitutional rights will
overcome any rights granted by a state.' The only remaining
question involved the burden of proof necessary to show a
violation of an accused's constitutional rights.'9

186. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800-02, 789 P.2d at 942-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761-63. Despite its
reluctance to search for indications of voters' intent beyond the language of the constitutional
amendment, the majority addressed Delaney's claim that the ballot argument in favor of Proposition
5 indicated that only confidential information was worthy ofprotection. Id. at 801-03, 789 P.2d at
943-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762-63. While the ballot argument referred only to confidential information,
the majority stated that the greater weight should be placed on the unambiguous language of article
I, section 2(b), rather than on a claim based on an extrinsic source. Id.
187. Id. at 804, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764. The majority also addressed the
findings of two appellate courts, which disagreed as to whether confidential information is protected
by the shield law. See Liggett v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 420,423-24,260 Cal. Rptr. 161,
171-72 (1989), review granted and opinion superseded, 788 P.2d 34, 263 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1989)
(stating that the shield law protects only confidential information); New York Times Co. v. Superior
Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 679, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426, 429-30 (1988), afd, 51 Cal. 3d 43, 796 P.2d
811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990), (stating that the shield law protects nonconfidential as well as
confidential information).
188. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805, 789 P.2d at 945-46, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 805-06, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 807, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
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3. Balancing the Interests
The majority formulated a balancing test to determine whether
a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial outweighs
a reporter's interest in asserting the shield law.193 The majority
began with a threshold requirement which a defendant would have
to meet in order to overcome a prima facie showing by a reporter
that the information is protected by the shield law.'94 The
majority stated that a defendant must first show a "reasonable
' 19 5
possibility the information will materially assist his defense.'
The majority's threshold requirement altered the showing that was
required in many past cases, where appellate courts had held that
the defendant must show that the evidence is "necessary" to the
defense.'96 However, the majority indicated that the threshold
requirements of Hammarley and Hallissy were actually consistent
with the "reasonable possibility" standard, and that the only
difference is a cognitive one. 9 7 The additional requirement that
the information sought must "materially assist the defense" is a
variation of the higher standard employed in lower court decisions,
which have required a showing that the evidence sought might lead
to the defendant's "exoneration."' 98 The majority determined
that the higher showing required by the trial courts places too great
a burden on the trial court to determine whether the information
sought would lead a jury to exonerate a defendant.'
Hf the defendant meets the threshold requirement, the majority's
test then employs a multitude of balancing factors to consider the
importance of protecting the unpublished information.2" The first

193. Id. at 809-13, 789 P.2d at 949-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-70.
194. Id. at 807-08, 789 P.2d at 947-48, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
195. Id. at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
196. Id. See Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045-46, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635,
638-39 (1988); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 614
(1979).
197. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808 n.22, 789 P.2d at 948 n.22, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767 n.22.
198. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 24-25, 201
Cal Rptr. 207, 215-16 (1984); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241,251, 149 Cal. Rptr.
421, 427 (1978).
199. Delaney, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 808-09, 789 P.2d at 948-49, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
200. Id. at 809, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.

1400

1991/ Delaney v. Superior Court
factor the majority considered is whether the information being
sought by the defendant is "confidential or sensitive."2 The
majority determined that confidential or sensitive information is
deserving of greater protection than nonconfidential or nonsensitive
information. 2 The majority also noted the impact that revelation
of a confidential source would have upon the newsperson's ability
to gather news in the future. 0 3
The second factor to be considered is the interests sought to be
protected by the shield law.204 Noting that the policy behind the
shield law is to protect reporters from breaching the confidence
placed in them by their sources, the majority stated that if the
criminal defendant requesting the information was the source the
reporters were trying to protect, the reporters cannot argue that this
confidence has been breached.20 5 Therefore, in situations in which
the criminal defendant is the source of the information,20 the
6
reporters' future newsgathering ability will not be prejudiced.
The third factor cited by the majority in considering the
protections afforded particular information is the value of the
information to the criminal defendant. 20 7 The majority indicated
a showing by the defendant that the information would go to the
"heart of his case" would tend to weigh in favor of
disclosure.20 8
Another issue the majority considered was whether the criminal
defendant must show a lack of available alternative sources for the
unpublished information requested from the newspersons. 20
While the majority acknowledged that some appellate court

201. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769. The majority disapproved Hallissy,
which did not take into account the fact that the defendant himself was the source of the information
being protected by the reporters in finding that the right of the reporters under the shield law
outweighed the criminal defendant's right to the information. Id. at 810-12 n.27, 789 P.2d at 949-51
n.27, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-70 n.27.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 811, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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decisions applied a rigid test requiring the defendant to "exhaust
all alternative sources," 21 before compelling newspersons to
disclose the information, the majority stated that in light of a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, a rigid alternative
source requirement was not always necessary. 2" The majority
instructed trial courts to examine the nature of the unpublished
information to determine whether an alternative source requirement
is necessary.212 After finding that the alternative source rule was
designed to protect confidential information, the majority rejected
such a strict rule, stating that to impose a strict alternative source
rule for nonconfidential information would be to "sustain a rule
without a reason., 213 In addition to examining the confidentiality
or sensitivity of the information, the majority listed other factors to
consider in determining the necessity of an alternative source
requirement, including the importance of the information to the
defendant and the practicality of obtaining certain information from
214
the alternative source.
In opposition to the motion compelling disclosure of their
observations of the Delaney arrest, the reporters claimed that the
court must require an in camera hearing to determine the necessity
of the forced disclosure.215 In response, the majority rejected the
need for an absolute requirement of an in camera hearing, finding

210. The majority disapproved the Haissy and Hammarley decisions based on their use of the
alternative source rule in a criminal trial in any circumstance. Id. at 813 n.29, 789 P.2d at 951 n.29,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 770 n.29. See Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045-1046,248
Cal. Rptr. 635, 638-39 (1988) (holding that defendant failed to demonstrate a lack of available
alternatives for the requested information that were less intrusive on the reporters' rights); Hammarley
v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 399-400, 153 Cal. Rptr 608, 614-15 (1979) (holding that
defendant made a substantial showing that alternative sources were unavailable). See also Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 282, 690 P.2d 625, 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1984) (using
a strict alternative source requirement in a defamation action).
211. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 811, 789 P.2d 934, 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 769.
212. Id. at 811-12, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
213. Id. at 812, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
214. Id. at 812-13, 789 P.2d at 950-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70. The majority also stated that
in determining whether an alternative source rule is applicable, a trial court should look to the type
of information being sought, Le., whether the information is an eyewitness observation by a reporter
or the names of potential witnesses, as well as the quality of the alternative source. Id. The majority
concluded that, in effect, the application of the alternative source requirement will depend on the facts
of the particular case. Id.
215. Id. at 813, 789 P.2d at 951-52, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71.
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that judicial resources would be wasted in conducting such a
hearing to evaluate undisclosed information that is neither
confidential or sensitive."'
4. The Application of the Balancing Test
The majority concluded that Delaney was entitled to the
reporters' testimony regarding whether Delaney consented to the
search of his jacket by the officers.2 17 The majority determined
that Delaney had met the threshold showing by proving that the
question of whether he consented to the search was critical to his
case.21 In balancing the factors to determine whether to require
the reporters to testify, the majority first stated that an observation
of a search and arrest in a public place cannot be considered
confidential or sensitive.219 Second, the majority concluded that
disclosure of the information would not impede the reporters'
future newsgathering abilities.220 In determining that the
reporters' future newsgathering abilities would not be prejudiced,
the majority looked to the source the reporter was trying to protect,
and found that since the only "source" involved was Delaney, the
reporters could not reasonably argue that Delaney would feel his
confidence had been breached if the reporters revealed the
information." Third, the majority reiterated the assertion that the
reporters' testimony would probably determine the outcome of the
case.22 2 Finally, the majority agreed with the trial judge's
determination that Delaney made a sufficient showing that
alternative sources were not available. 3 Having applied its
balancing test, the majority ordered the reporters to testify as to

216. Id. at 814, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
217. Id.
218. Id. The court cited the municipal court's finding that the reporters' testimony regarding
whether Delaney consented to the search by the officers is critical, since the case "will rise or fall
on the admission or not of those brass knuckles." Id.
219. Id. at 815, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
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whether Delaney had consented to the police search, and ordered
the superior court to vacate its prior orders and deny the reporters
habeas corpus relief.224
C. Concurrence by Justice Mosk
In a concurring opinion, Justice Mosk expressed his
225
disagreement with the balancing test set forth by the majority.
Justice Mosk stated that the importance of the federal constitutional
right to a fair trial outweighs any state interest, and that the focus
should be on determining the defendant's interests in the disclosure
of the6information, rather than the reporter's rights under the shield
22
law.
Justice Mosk suggested that the defendant should be required
to make two threshold showings.227 The defendant must first
show the existence of a reasonable possibility that the information
will assist the defense, and second that no alternative sources are
available.228 Unlike the majority, Justice Mosk emphasized the
importance of the alternative source requirement in preventing
misuse of the press.229 Justice Mosk stated that the question of
whether alternative sources are available addresses the central issue
of whether the defendant needs the information to receive a fair
trial.23 Justice Mosk concluded that the shield law immunity
dictates that the reporters' information should be avoided at all
possible costs."'
While Justice Mosk found that the alternative source rule
should be required as a threshold showing by the defendant, he
concluded that the rule is inapplicable when reporters are percipient

224. Id. at 817, 789 P.2d at 954, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
225. Id. at 817, 789 P.2d at 954, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773 (Mosk, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 817-18, 789 P.2d at 954-55, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74 (Mosk, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 818, 789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J., concurring).
228. Id. These requirements were also suggested by the majority as part of their balancing of
factors. Id. at 807-13, 789 P.2d at 947-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766-70.
229. Id. at 821, 789 P.2d at 957, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 820, 789 P.2d at 956,268 Cal. Rptr. at 775 (Mosk, J., concurring).
231. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
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witnesses to an event. 2 Therefore, since Delaney had shown that
the information sought from the reporters was important to his
case, Justice
Mosk agreed with the majority that the reporters must
3
testify.

23

D. Concurrence by Justice Broussard
Justice Broussard wrote the second concurring opinion, stating
that the majority's exclusive emphasis on the language of the
California constitution and Evidence Code section 1070 in
determining whether the shield law applied to unpublished
nonconfidential information was misplaced.' Justice Broussard
emphasized the importance of the legislative history and judicial
interpretation of the shield law in determining to which areas the
provision should apply. 5 Justice Broussard concluded that both
the language and history of the shield law demonstrate that the
shield law applies to all unpublished information regardless of
whether the information is confidential, therefore agreeing with the
result reached by the majority.236 Despite his disagreement with
the majority's reasoning in determining the scope of the shield law,
Justice Broussard agreed with the majority's analysis in
determining that Delaney's rights under the federal constitution
outweigh the reporters asserted rights under the shield law.237

232. Id. at 821-22, 789 P.2d at 957, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 822, 789 P.2d at 957-58, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776-77 (Mosk, L, concurring). Since a
percipient witness is not an "alternative source" in the sense that the observer of an event is not a
fungible, stable source, as is a recording of an interview or a document, Justice Mosk determined that
the better description of a percipient witness is a source of different information, which is not relevant
for alternative source rule purposes. Id. (Mosk, L, concurring).
234. Id. at 822-23, 789 P.2d at 958, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Broussard, J., concurring).
235. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring).
236. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 825, 789 P.2d at 959-60, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79 (Broussard, J., concurring).
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Ill. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

The decision in Delaney settled a dispute among the appellate
courts by concluding that the California shield law applies to
nonconfidential as well as confidential information. The court,
through the adoption of a balancing test, gave trial courts a guide
in determining when criminal defendants' fair trial rights under the
federal constitution have been implicated. Therefore, the Delaney
decision impacts both the scope of the shield law and its
application in light of the interests of a criminal defendant.
A. The Impact of Delaney on the Shield Law
The Delaney decision will have an immediate impact on
California appellate courts' interpretation of the shield law. In
contrast to a number of appellate court decisions, including the
appellate court in the Delaney case itself, the California Supreme
Court clearly stated that the shield law is applicable to
nonconfidential as well as confidential sources, and that the shield
law is an immunity from contempt, rather than a privilege.238 The
Delaney court reached these conclusions by simply examining the
unambiguous language of both the constitutional and statutory
shield laws, thus avoiding an analysis of the intention of the
legislature or the voters who enacted the law.3
While the Delaney decision provided some long-awaited
answers regarding the scope of the shield law, the decision is also
noteworthy for the questions it left open. Most notably, the
Delaney decision, involving a criminal defendant, did not specify
the requirements for civil litigants in overcoming the shield law
immunity. Furthermore, although the prosecution in the Delaney
case requested the reporters to appear and testify regarding their
percipient observations, the court did not determine whether the

238. See supra note 185 (discussing the court's findings regarding the privilege/immunity
distinction).
239. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of the
express terms of the shield law).
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prosecution, as opposed to the defense, has the right to overcome
the shield law.240 Instead, the court focused on Delaney's rights
to compel the reporters' testimony.
Another point the court did not address is whether, following
Delaney, newspersons may argue that compelled disclosure of
unpublished information violates their first amendment rights as
well as their rights under the shield law. Despite the California
Supreme Court's recognition of a qualified first amendment
privilege for reporters in Mitchell,241 the Delaney court proceeded
exclusively under the California shield law in determining the
relative rights of the reporters and the defendant.242 It is not
known, therefore, whether the qualified privilege recognized in
Mitchell, a civil case involving the protection of confidential
sources, extends to the situation presented in Delaney, a criminal
action involving nonconfidential unpublished information.243
Recognition by the court of a qualified first amendment right
would have eliminated the Delaney court's supremacy clause 2 "
argument, however, and might have diminished the court's analysis
that Delaney's rights outweighed the reporters' rights. 245 On the
other hand, the court may have been implying that the qualified

240. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 816 n.34, 789 P.2d at 954 n.34, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773 n.34
(stating that the question as to whether the state had the right to overcome the shield law was
rendered moot by the decision that Delaney was entitled to the information sought from the
reporters).
241. See Mitchellv. SuperiorCourt, 37 Cal. 3d at 274-84, 690 P.2d 625, 627-35, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 154-62 (1984) (finding a qualified first amendment privilege for a newsperson who faced sanctions
in addition to contempt, the immunity from which is contained in the California shield law). The
Mitchell court stated that "in a civil action a reporter... has a qualified privilege to withhold
disclosure of the identity of confidential sources and of unpublished information supplied by such
sources." Id. at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
242. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 794-817, 789 P.2d at 938-54, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757-73.
243. The California Supreme Court also refused to state whether a qualified first amendment
privilege exists for civil litigants in its decision in New York Times v. SuperiorCourt,51 Cal. 3d 453,
460 n.8, 796 P.2d 811, 815 n.8, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 n.8 (1990). See Comment, A Barometer of
Freedom of the Press: The Opinions ofMr. Justice White, 8 PEPPDINE L. REv. 157, 172 (1980)
(stating that press privileges should not extend to criminal actions).
244. U.S. CoNsT., art. VI, cI. 2; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b).
245. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 814-17, 789 P.2d at 952-54,268 Cal. Rptr. at 952-54. Cf. Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 272, 274-75, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155 (1984)
(illustrating the importance of reporters' right to withhold information under the federal first
amendment).
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first amendment privilege for newspersons does not extend to
criminal trials. Despite the questions left unanswered following
Delaney, the court's definitive statement that the shield law applies
to nonconfidential information was an important step in expanding
the application of the shield law to information which is afforded
protection under the express language of the shield law.
B. The Delaney Balancing Test
In light of the case law handed down by the Supreme Court of
the United States, which dictates that evidentiary rules and
procedures that interfere with the defense are necessarily overcome
upon a showing of a violation of a criminal defendant's federal
constitutional right to a fair trial, it is necessary for courts to
balance the rights of a criminal defendant with countervailing state
interests.24 The Delaney court weighed the competing state
interests and the importance of the information to the criminal
defendant through its four-part balancing test. Before the balancing
test is initiated, however, a defendant is required to meet a
threshold requirement by establishing a "reasonable possibility"
that the information requested will assist the defense. One may
argue that the "reasonable possibility" standard places an
insubstantial burden on defendants, and therefore does not afford
reporters adequate protection under the shield law. The "reasonable
possibility" standard implies that a criminal defendant must merely
show that the information requested is relevant, since the
requirement that the requested information has a "reasonable
possibility" of aiding the defendant's case is analogous to the
general definition of relevant evidence, namely, evidence having
any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less
likely.247 Since terming evidence as relevant is a threshold

246. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57-60 (1986) (finding the strong public
interest in psychotherapist-patient privileges could be overcome only upon a finding by the trial judge
that the information would change the outcome of the trial); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20
(1974) (acknowledging the strong state interest in preserving the confidential nature of juvenile
convictions, but finding the defendant's rights outweighed the state's interest).
247. See FED. R. EVm. 401; CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966) (defining relevant evidence).
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requirement for any evidence introduced during trial,24 8 the
"reasonable possibility" standard set forth in Delaney places no
additional burden on a criminal defendant and affords no additional
protection for newspersons to withhold unpublished
information.2 49
Once the threshold requirement is met, the trial court must

initiate a balancing test to weigh the relative interests of
newspersons and criminal defendants. In determining the weight to
be given the state interest in a particular case, the majority
proceeded to examine the policy reasons and purpose behind the
shield law, finding that the shield law was enacted in order to
protect a newsperson's future newsgathering ability." The court
concluded that only the protection of confidential or sensitive
information is needed to preserve the ability of reporters to gather
news."1 Therefore, the majority's balancing test provided little
or no protection to nonconfidential or nonsensitive information. 2

248. See FED. 1L E m. 402; CAL. Evm. CODE § 350 (West 1966) (stating that only relevant
evidence is admissible).
249. This fact was recognized by the California Supreme Court in Mitchell; a civil case, which
stated that "mere relevance is insufficient to compel discovery; disclosure should be denied unless
the information goes to the heart of the plaintiff's claim." Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 280, 690 P.2d at
632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
250. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 810,789 P.2d 934, 949,268 Cal. Rptr. 753,
768 (1990).
251. Id.
252. The majority stated that it was not eliminating all protection for nonconfidential
information, by stressing the importance of confidential or sensitive information. Id. at 810 n.26, 789
P.2d at 949 n.26, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.26. However, the practical effect of the majority's emphasis
on confidential or sensitive information is to render the protection for nonconfidential and
nonsensitive information virtually nonexistent. For instance, under the majority's requirement, a
criminal defendant who wishes to compel nonconfidential information from a newsperson will not
likely be required to prove the existence of alternative sources for the information. Id. at 812-13, 789
P.2d at 950-51,268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70. Furthermore, the majority concluded that only confidential
or sensitive information should receive the benefit of in camera review by the trial judge. Id. at 81314, 789 P.2d at 951-52, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71. Finally, the majority's conclusion that future
newsgathering will not be impinged by the disclosure of nonconfidential and nonsensitive information
eliminates both factors in the balancing test which recognize newspersons' interests under the shield
law. Therefore, the result of the majority's balancing test in regard to production of nonconfidential
and nonsensitive information is to require criminal defendants to merely meet the threshold
requirement by showing a reasonable possibility that the information will assist their defense. As
noted above, this requirement provides scant protection for a newsperson's nonconfidential and
nonsensitive information.
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1. Is Nonconfidential Information Worthy of Protection?
The majority stated its preference for confidential and sensitive
information over nonconfidential and nonsensitive information
despite its recognition that the shield law does not make such a
distinction. 3 One may question the majority's premise that
nonconfidential or nonsensitive information is undeserving of the
protection afforded confidential and sensitive information."
As the majority noted, shield laws are designed to protect
against the chilling effect that disclosure has on future
newsgathering. 5 However, there is no indication that this
chilling effect will be less severe with the compelled production of
nonconfidential or nonsensitive information. 6 For example,
forcing a newsperson to become a witness at a trial may create a
perception that can cause sources or reporters to become
apprehensive. 7 The burden placed on newspersons to respond
to or to contest a subpoena is equally great, whether the
information is of a confidential or nonconfidential nature.5' In

253. Id. 50 Cal. 3d at 804, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764. The irony in the fact that
the majority afforded greater deference to confidential information after recognizing that the shield
law contains no such distinction was pointed out by Justice Mosk in his concurring opinion. Id. at
818, 789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J., concurring).
254. The majority defined -sensitive" information as information which, if disclosed, would
restrict the potential newsgathering capabilities of reporters. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 768. However, since the compelled disclosure of any unpublished information may harm the
future newsgathering capabilities of reporters, concluding that the information is nonconfidential or
nonsensitive should not preclude an analysis of the newspersons" interests under the shield law. See
infranotes 256-60 and accompanying text (arguing that the majority places too much emphasis upon
the confidential nature of the information).
255. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
256. See United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (stating that
.'although no confidential source or information is involved... this is irrelevant to the chilling effect
enforcement of the subpoena would have on the flow of information to the press and public-);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (N.D. Fla. 1975) (stating that "the compelled
production of a reporter's [nonconfidentiall resource materials is equally as invidious as the
compelled disclosure of his confidential informants"). Butsee United States v. LaRouche Campaign,
841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding with no explanation that confidential information
is deserving of greater protection than nonconfidential information); Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387
Mass. 1, 7, 438 N.E.2d 805, 809, stay denied, 458 U.S. 1306 (1982) (finding no common law or
constitutional privilege where source and contents are disclosed in article).
257. In re Schuman, 114 NJ. 14, 27, 552 A.2d 602, 611 (1989).
258. Id.
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addition, it seems reasonable to assume that potentially valuable
sources, who learn of a newsperson's forced testimony, will be less
likely to provide their stories to newspersons whether the
information to which the newsperson testified was confidential or
nonconfidential in nature." Consequently, compelled disclosure
of any type of information may cause apprehension to newspersons
and discourage potential confidential sources, as well as place a
heavy burden on the media to disclose information. These factors
could certainly hinder the future ability of a newsperson to gather
news. Since both the language of the shield law and the practical
consequences of compelled disclosure indicate that nonconfidential
information is worthy of protection, one can argue that the majority
placed too much emphasis on the protection of confidential and
sensitive information.
2. The Alternative Source Requirement
The majority also looked to the confidential nature of the
information when determining whether a strict alternative source
rule should be utilized.26 The balancing test set forth by the
majority requires a defendant, in certain instances, to seek
alternative sources before compelling the reporters to disclose the
unpublished information. The alternative source rule is a valuable
requirement due to the fact that when a defendant can obtain
similar material from other sources, the interests of both the
newsperson and the criminal defendant are protected.26 While an
alternative source rule is recognized by a majority of jurisdictions
that either possess a statutory shield law or recognize a qualified
first amendment right to withhold information, the Delaney
majority qualified its adoption of the alternative source rule by only

259. Id.
260. Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 812, 789 P.2d 934, 950,268 Cal. Rptr. 753,
769.
261. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 819, 789 P.2d at 955-56, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75 (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (citing State v. Boiardo, 82 NJ. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (1980)).
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applying the rule when confidential information is requested.262
However, as noted above,263 the confidentiality or sensitivity of
the information should not be dispositive of the rights of
newspersons.
The underlying purpose behind the alternative source rule, to
prevent reporters from being an initial source of information when
alternate sources are available, was seemingly disregarded by the
court in Delaney. During the search of Delaney's jacket which
produced the brass knuckles, four police officers, the defendant,
and the defendant's companion were all in a position to observe
whether the defendant consented to the officer's search of the
jacket.2" Only the reporters were asked to testify.265 The
majority downplayed the availability of other witnesses by stating
that, contrary to the reporters, neither266the companion nor the
officers were "disinterested" witnesses.
Presumably, the officers would have testified that Delaney
consented to the search of his jacket, and Delaney's companion
would have asserted that Delaney did not consent to the search. On
the other hand, since the trial court failed to inquire into the
individual impressions of the officers and the companion, it is
possible that the witnesses' testimony would not be in conflict, and
the reporters' testimony would be unnecessary. In compelling the
reporters' testimony before conducting an adequate investigation
into the content of the statements of the officers and Delaney's
companion, the court treated the reporters as an initial source of the
information. One may argue that, despite the nonconfidential nature
of the information sought, a newsperson protected by the express

262. Id. at 812,789 P.2d at 950,268 Cal. Rptr. at 769. See also Marcus, supra note 13, at 850
(stating that virtually all courts agree that a strict alternative source test is required); Comment,
California's "New" Newsmen's Law and Criminal Defendants' Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 219, 249-50 (1986) (calling for a strict alternative source rule). California cases
adopting a rigid alternative source rule include Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038,
1046,248 Cal. Rptr. 635,641 (1988); Mitchellv. SuperiorCourt,37 Cal. 3d 282,283,690 P.2d 625,
634 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1984); and KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 384-86,
186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216-17 (1982).
263. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
264. Id. at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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terms of the shield law should not be an initial source of an
investigation when several other unexplored alternatives are
reasonably available. Therefore, absent a showing that the four
officers and the defendant's companion had no personal knowledge
as to whether Delaney consented to the search, or that the
testimony of the reporters was necessary to resolve a conflict
between the witnesses, the court should not compel the reporters to
disclose the unpublished information.
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is the author's opinion that
the balancing test adopted by the majority does not provide
adequate protection to newspersons, in light of the nature of the
California shield law. A more appropriate standard would require
the defendant to establish at the threshold a reasonable probability
that the unpublished information is relevant, material, and
necessary to the defense, which is a stricter standard requiring more
than a showing of mere relevance.267 Once this requirement is
satisfied, the court should undertake an in camera inspection to
determine the extent to which compelled disclosure will deter the
newsperson's future ability to gather news. While the court may
consider the nature of the information sought, nonconfidential
information should receive more than the nominal protection it
receives under the Delaney test. Next, the defendant must establish
a lack of alternative sources for the information sought. Finally, the
court should examine the importance of the information to the
defendant's case. The factors listed in this test attempt to grant
appropriate deference to the rights of criminal defendants, in light
of the strong countervailing interests of newspersons under the
California shield law.

267. The "reasonable probability" requirement is set forth in the New Jersey shield law
privilege, which expressly addresses the relative rights of criminal defendants and reporters. See NJ.
STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21.3(b) (West Supp. 1990). See also Comment, Sixth Amendment Limitations
on the Newsperson's Privilege:A Breach in the Shield, 13 RuTrERs L.J. 361,387 (1981) (criticizing
the language of the New Jersey shield law as requiring a defendant to prove more than a sixth

amendment right prior to in camera inspection).
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IV. CONCLUSION

In Delaney v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the shield law to protect nonconfidential as
well as confidential information, and set forth a four-part balancing
test which expressly recognized the competing interests of
newspersons when determining whether the defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial has been impinged.
While the balancing test set forth in Delaney seeks to
accommodate the state's interests under the shield law as well as
a crlminal defendant's interests in a fair trial, the factors adopted
by the majority are open to scrutiny. For instance, one may argue
that the court placed too great an emphasis upon the nature of the
information sought by the criminal defendant. Despite the
majority's recognition that the shield law extends to confidential
and nonconfidential information, the Delaney decision virtually
eliminated any protection accorded to nonconfidential information
in relation to the rights of a criminal defendant.
The majority's alternative source requirement also stresses the
importance of confidential and sensitive information, and may lead
to unnecessary intrusions into a newsperson's resources when
alternative sources are readily available, as in the Delaney case
itself. Furthermore, the threshold requirement adopted by the
majority, requiring defendants to show a reasonable possibility the
information sought will assist their defense, may not afford
newspersons adequate protection from the initiation of the
balancing test.
While one may find flaws in the balancing test set forth by the
majority, the test's flexible requirements provide trial courts with
enough latitude to use their own discretion in determining whether
to compel production of a newsperson's unpublished information.
Therefore, only when trial courts are faced with resolving conflicts
between criminal defendants and newspersons will the true impact
of the Delaney balancing test be realized.
Ian W. Craig
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